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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A4-103(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
· For over 10 years, plaintiff Richard Specht ("Specht") has fought to protect his
property rights against the unlawful infringement by his neighbors Paul and Debbie Hyde
(collectively, the "Hydes") and the Town of Big Water (the "Town"). Starting in 2004,
Specht has sought redress from the Town's illegal sanction of a variance and roadway
change that directly affects the use and enjoyment of his property. After a full litigation
between Specht and the Town in which Specht initially prevailed in 2006, the Hydes
moved to intervene in 2007 and the case essentially began anew in 2012 with Specht's
Third Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). This new round of pleading resulted in an
effective award of summary judgment against Specht and dismissal of his action, which
is the subject of the instant appeal.
At its essence, this matter addresses the Hydes' wrongful actions in their attempt to
circumvent the applicable zoning regulations and the Town's illegal approval and
assistance of that conduct. The Hydes have illegally modified their property and a public
roadway, have illegally installed a septic system without proper permits, have wrongfully
destroyed a public-financed road project by destroying a cul-de-sac in order to enlarge

vJ
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their own property, and have undertaken demolition and construction work without
needed permits and approvals.
The Town has assisted the Hydes in their illegal conduct in lock step. The Town
wrongfully issued a variance for the Hydes' septic system in contravention of the Town's
own rules and laws, illegally issued a "Development Agreement" (R. 53) in violation of
Utah law, and illegally allowed the Hydes' to demolish a publicly constructed cul-de-sac
without legitimate reason and without proper permitting. The Town took such action
without proper notice, without legal foundation or basis, and in violation of municipal
and state law.
Since there were no issues of fact as to the illegality of the actions by both the
Town and Hydes, Specht filed the motion for summary judgment in dispute in November
2013, and renewed it in September 2014. Specht also sought an award-in his favor as a
matter of law on the basis of the illegal, arbitrary and capricious nature of the Town and
the Hydes' actions. Astonishingly, even with the extraordinary step of taking depositions
in an after-the-fact attempt to create a record of what transpired, actually weakening the
record from that which allowed the trial court to initially award summary judgment in
Specht's favor, the trial court somehow found justification to deny Specht's renewed
motion for summary judgment and instead dismissed Specht's action in its entirety, with
prejudice.

vJ
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Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court improperly denied Specht's motion for
summary judgment on the merits, and granted summary judgment for the Hydes and
Town instead without the Hydes and Town filing a cross-motion.

Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
presents a question oflaw reviewed for correctness. See Howard v. Manes, 2013 UT App
208, ,r 8,309 P.3d 279. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when 'there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.' [UTAH] R. [CIV. P.] 56(c). [This Court] review[s] the grant of summary
judgment for correctness, as a question of law, giving no deference to the district court's
legal conclusions." Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 2013 UT 6, 15,297 P.3d
578.

Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court improperly held that the decisions regarding
the reduction of the cul-de-sac were an administrative decision subject to an
administrative remedy exhaustion requirement.

Standard of review: "As a general matter, [this Court] review[s] the [trial]
court's decision for correctness." Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57,
1 26, 167 P.3d 1016. To the extent that the trial court's decision in this regard constituted
a finding of fact, the trial court's finding of facts should be set aside if they are clearly
erroneous. UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a); Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App. 283, 19,
288 P.3d 1046. "A finding is clearly erroneous 'only if the finding is without adequate

3
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evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the law."' Id. (citing State v.

Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
vi)

Procedure§ 2585 (1971))). This Court can overturn such findings when they are against
the clear weight of the evidence or where it reaches a "definite and finn conviction that a
mistake has been made." Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
vP

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This appeal arises out of Specht's motion for summary judgment and the Town's
opposition and assertion of the existence of disputed facts. In 2014, the Town approved
an application (the "Application") for a setback variance (the "Variance") upon property
(the "Property"), owned by Defendants/Interveners, the Hydes. The Town also allowed a
reduction of a cul-de-sac size adjoining the Specht and Hyde properties (the
"Reduction"). Specht's property is adjacent to the Hydes' Property and abuts the
unlawfully reduced cul-de-sac. Specht contends that the Town's decisions and actions
were arbitrary, capricious and unlawful, and without proper notice to him and the other
owners of property on the cul-de-sac in question.
Specht timely filed a petition for review of the Town's actions with regard to the
Variance and the Reduction on August 18, 2004. In June 2005,' the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. In his cross-motion, Specht s~ught an order finding that
the Town's decision to grant the Variance and the Reduction were arbitrary, capricious

4
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and illegal. The trial court granted Specht's cross-motion and denied the Town's motion,
finding that the Town failed to comply with its own ordinances (the "First Order''). The
Town appealed. Thereafter, the Hydes moved to intervene because the First Order
required them to combine their nonconforming lots.
On appeal, this Court reversed the First Order, and Specht subsequently renewed
his summary judgment motion with the trial court. The Town did not file a cross ..motion
this time, but only filed an opposition insisting that issues of fact existed, which
precluded an award of summary judgment in Specht's favor. The Court denied Specht's
motion and dismissed the case (the "Second Order"). Specht timely appealed the Second
Order. The Town filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 10, UTAH R. APP. P., which Specht
opposed. This Court denied the Town's Rule 10 Motion.

II.

Statement of Facts
A.

The Parties

Plaintiff Specht is a property owner in the Town of Big Water (R. 1, 5), whose land
abuts both the cul-de-sac at issue in this matter (R. 1) and the Hyde Property (R. 1, 5).
vJ

Defendant Town of Big Water is a municipality incorporated pursuant to the applicable
laws of the State of Utah (R. 5). Intervening defendants the Hydes are the filers of the
Application and recipients of the Variance and the Reduction granted by the Town of Big
Water (R. 6).

Ill

5
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B.

Factual Summary

In 2004, the Town arbitrarily, capriciously, and illegally approved the
Application for the Variance upon a property (the "Hyde Property"), owned by
Defendants/lnterveners the Hydes, as well as the Reduction resulting in an unlawful
reduction in cul-de-sac size (R. 6-8). Specht's property is next door to the Hyde
~

Property and abuts the unlawfully reduced cul-de-sac. Specht timely filed a petition
for review of the Town's decision on August 18, 2004 (R. 1-4). In June of 2005,
Specht moved for Summary Judgment (R. 86-87), and Town cross-moved for

vi

Summary Judgment (R. 113-114). In Specht's motion, he sought an order finding that
the Town's decision to grant the Variance and the Reduction were arbitrary and
capricious, and illegal (R. 95-102).
The Town adopted the zoning ordinance applicable here in 1986 (R. 74-80).
Under that ordinance, the Property is located in a residential zone classified as RE-1
(R.150 and 612-614).
The RE-1 zone requires, among other things, that a minimum lot size be½
acre (id.). Since a sanitary sewer does not serve the Property, a septic system would
be necessary to serve the waste use of a residential dwelling (R. 612-614). At about
I 0,000 square feet, the Property is too small to accommodate the installation of a
septic system (R. 29). Despite this, the Hydes applied for a building permit on July 2,
2004 (R. 29). Before paying for the permit in August of 2004 and obtaining
permission, the Hydes began site demolition work on the cul-de-sac in June, 2004 (R.

11, 38).

6
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Understanding and admitting that the Property did not meet the requirements
under the RE-1 zone needed to build a home (R. 52, 53), the Hydes applied for the
v;)

Variance on July 9, 2004 (R. 50-51 ). After a hearing on July 20, 2004, the Town
granted the Variance (R. 45-48, 49).
The transcript of the July 20, 2014 variance hearing (the "Hearing")
demonstrates the complete lack of support for the variance (R. 1062-1072). First, Paul
Hyde admitted that all of the lots in his subdivision were under the ¼ acre requirement
for the RE-1 zone (R. 1065). Next, Paul Hyde admitted that the size of the lot did not
prohibit him from building a home, or even a 1,200 square foot home, but merely may
have affected the ability to set out the footprint he desired to allow him to park his
houseboat at the Property 1 (R. 1064, 1066). Additionally, if Hydes were not granted the
Variance, Paul Hyde may have been required to build his deck without the vertical
covering that he wanted, which made the deck a structure subject to the setback
requirements (R. 1067).
Based on the above claims alone, the Town was somehow able to decide that
"[o]h, it definitely meets all five requirements, definitely, for the variance" (R. 1071 ).
During the pendency of this action, Paul Hyde admitted under oath that he did not face
any legally cognizable "hardship" (R. 752 ("No real need. I just wanted to"); 19:13;

1

Paul Hyde would have been forced to park his houseboat on his other adjoining lot ifhe

was not granted the Variance (R. 1066).
vJ)
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532-533). Mr. Hyde simply said that without the Variance, he would have had to
"change[] the footprint [of his house]" and would not have been able to build the
garage he desired (R. 753, 532).
Mr. Hyde himself testified that his lots were not substandard and in fact were
just like every other lot in the area. He stated that "[t]here were many other lots in the
same area of the same size that had houses which had permitted septic systems ... " (R.
524-534). In fact, Mr. Hyde testified that the issue of his lot being below ¼ acre was in
fact not a hardship unique to him, admitting that "[n]one of the lots in that subdivision
are a quarter acre" (R. 529). Mr. Hyde admitted that neither the Variance nor the
Reduction were needed to install a septic tank on this Property: "[i]t would not have
been necessary" (R. 532). Mr. Hyde wanted the particular layout of his house - as he
calls it, the "footprint" - because he wanted a certain "shop space" (R. 533). In other
words, if he built a house with the same square footage as the one he built but with a
different "footprint," Mr. Hyde would not have been able to construct his "shop space
... as [he] wanted it" (R. 533-534 ).

\&

vN

8
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Thereafter, the Hydes sought the Reduction from the Town to sanction the
destruction they already imposed on the cul-de-sac (R. 392, 56, 62-63, 67-73, 708-710,
901-9 I 0). On August 6, 2004 (R. 54), the Town placed the Reduction on the
Commission Agenda for the August 10, 2004 meeting (R. 55). Thereafter, the Town
again placed the Reduction on the September 21, 2004 Council agenda (R. 66). The
Town, however, provided only 24 hours notice of this meeting by posting the agenda on
September 20, 2004 (R. 65). On October 26, 2004, the Town issued an Ordinance
granted the Hyde's Reduction request (R. 67-70). This litigation timely followed (R. 59).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Throughout this case, the Town has made two arguments in support of its claim
that granting the Variance and Reduction was neither arbitrary nor capricious: 1) the
vJ

Town had a record justifying its decision; and 2) Mr. Hyde provided "testimony at the
[administrative] hearing" which allegedly justified the conclusion that without the
Variance and Reduction, Mr. Hyde would suffer a hardship, and therefore the Variance
and Reduction were justified. The facts, however, demonstrate otherwise.

2

At the meeting reviewing the Reduction request, Paul Hyde claimed that he requested

the Reduction (R. 39-42). No petition by the Hydes seeking the Reduction has ever been
produced or discovered.

9
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Now, over ten years from its original action, the Town has all but admitted that
there is no factual record justifying its actions. At the Town's deposition in December
20123, counsel for Specht asked the Town questions regarding the Variance and
Reduction, to which the Town replied either that it "did not know" or that it would "get
back to" counsel with any relevant infonnation or answers (R. 1092-95). After the
deposition, the Town provided Specht with its purported responses to Specht's
unanswered questions. These responses, however, provided no additional substantive
\/JP

infonnation. In fact, the Town responded to several of Specht's questions with the
answer that: "No record of such is extant" (R. 518-19). Ifno record exists, the Town's
actions cannot be justified and were unlawful, since the applicable UTAH CODE ANN.

~

sections require a record of proof substantiating the Hydes entitlement to the Variance
and the Reduction.
The record before the trial court on Specht's motion for summary judgment

vJ

demonstrated that the Town did not have sufficient evidence before it in 2004 to properly
issue either the Variance or the Reduction. The lack of proper statutory and legal
foundation for the issuance of the Variance and the Reduction renders the Town's actions

3

Cases such as this are usually handled on a "record review" basis, but because there

really is no record below in violation of the UTAH CODE ANN., the parties stipulated to
limited discovery to establish basic facts.
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arbitrary, capricious and unlawful. This Court must direct the trial court to vacate its
decisions, grant Specht's motion to strike, and enter summary judgment in Specht's favor.
~

ARGUMENT
I.

~

The Trial Court Wrongfully Denied Specht's Summary Judgment
Motion and Improperly Dismissed His Claims
A. Specht was Entitled to an Award of Summary Judgment
Motions for summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c); Swan Creek Vil!. Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, ,r 16,

134 P.3d 1122 (quoting Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ,r 15, 57 P.3d 997). "Where the
moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each
element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 10, 177 P.3d 600.

Once the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must set forth
specific facts demonstrating there is a dispute about a genuine issue of material fact.
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ,r 31, 54 P.3d 1054. As such, the non-

moving party may not simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading."
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). Moreover, a genuine issue of material fact exists only "where, on

the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ[.]" Jones v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 2012 UT 52, 'if 8, 286 P.3d 31.

11
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This Court reviews the trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness,
granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love,
2002 UT 133, Pl 1, 63 P.3d 721; Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ii
11, 54 P.3d 1177. This Court considers whether, in undertaking its review pursuant to
Rule 56(c), UTAH R. CIV. P., the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of
material fact existed and whether it correctly applied the law. Woodbury Amsource, Inc.
v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, 1 4, 73 P.3d 362, 364. Here, the proper consideration of

the undisputed facts in this manner in light of the applicable law require an award of
summary judgment in favor of Specht.

1.

The Town Unlawfully Granted the Variance and the Reduction

In the case at bar, the Towns' actions on the Hydes' Application for the
Reduction and the Variance were illegal and void because they violated the Town
Code regarding uses in the RE-1 zone in which the Property is located, and because
that Application does not propose any use that can be permitted in RE-1 zone. "The
authority to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is conferred on
municipalities by the state through enabling statutes." Hatch v. Boulder Town

Council, 2001 UT App 55, 17, 21 P.3d 245 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-401-409
(1999)). Accordingly, municipalities must strictly comply with the requirements set
out in this grant of authority. Id. Once a municipality has properly adopted
ordinances, it is "not entitled to disregard [them]." Springville Citizens/or a Better

12
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Community v. City ofSpringville, 1999 UT 25, ,r 30,979 P.2d 332. Here, the Town
disregarded its ordinances and applicable law in wrongfully granting the Hyde's
Variance and Reduction requests. The undisputed facts demonstrate the invalidity of
the Town's actions, requiring an award of 1;)ummary judgment in Specht's favor as a
matter of law.
~

a. The Town Erred in Granting the Variance

An applicant for a variance has several burdens to meet. Specifically, the
Hydes were required to establish that:
(a)(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an
unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out
the general purpose of the zoning ordinance;
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do

not generally apply to other properties in the same district;

vJ

(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a
substantial property right possessed by other property in the same district;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and
will not be contrary to the public interest; and
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial
justice done.
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning
ordinance would cause umeasonable hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the
board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship unless the
alleged hardship:
(A) is located on or associated with the property for which
the variance is sought; and
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not

from conditions that are general to the neighborhood.
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning
ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable
hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or economic.
13

\:JP
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(c) In determining whether or not there are special circumstances
attached to the property under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment
may find that special circumstances exist only if the special circumstances:
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and
(ii) deprive the property ofprivileges granted to other properties in
the same district.

(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the
conditions justifying a variance have been met.
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-707 (2004) (emphasis added). 4 "Unless an applicant proves all
of these elements, a variance may not be approved." Krejci v. City ofSaratoga Springs,

4

The Utah Legislature amended this Section in 2005. Although renumbered, the

substance remains essentially the same:
(i) literal enforcement of the ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship for the

applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the land use ordinances;
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do not

generally apply to other properties in the same zone;
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial

property right possessed by other property in the same zone;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will not be
contrary to the public interest; and
(v) the spirit of the land use ordinance is observed and substantial justice
done.
va

UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-702(2)(a) (emphasis added).
14
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2013 UT 74,, 36,322 P.3d 662. UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-707 (now UTAH CODEANN.
§10-9a-702(2)(a)) does not give the Town discretion to grant a variance for any other
reason than those set forth therein. Wells v. Board ofAdjustment ofSalt Lake City Corp.,
936 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In fact, the Town could only issue the
Variance if all five of the requirements in Section 10-9-707(a) were satisfied. See id
Importantly, the grounds for a variance must be stated so that the reviewing court has
something to review. See id. ("Such findings are mandated"). Any variance without the
required statutory finding is illegal. See Patterson v. Utah County Board ofAdjustment,
893 P.2d 202, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Further, variance decisions are illegal when
they are not supported by ~'substantial evidence." See Wells, 936 P.2d at 1105; UTAH
~

CODE ANN. § 10-9-708(6) (2004). In this case, the Town's actions on the Hyde Variance
were illegal and void because the Variance was not supported by substantial evidence or
by express findings under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-707(a) (2004).
i. Substantial Evidence In Favor of A Variance Does Not Exist

All findings in support of a variance must be based on "substantial evidence,"
which is defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Bradley v. Payson Town Corp.,
2003 UT 16, ~ 15, 70 P.3d 47. It therefore is evidence that is more than a "mere scintilla"

15
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~

but less than the ''weight of the evidence." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. In deciding
whether substantial evidence exists, moreover, the Court must consider evidence that
vJ

"'fairly detracts' from the weight of the [Town's] evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board
ofReview, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted).

Under the applicable statute, the Town was required to find that the Hydes carried
their burden of proving that they were entitled to the Variance. Specifically, the Town
had to determine if the Hydes proved that a "literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance
would cause an unreasonable hardship" to them that was "not necessary to carry out the
general purpose of the zoning ordinance." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(i) (2004)
(emphasis added). The Hy des were also required to prove to the Town that: special
circumstances attached to the Hydes' Property that did not apply to others in the same
district; that the Variance was essential to the enjoyment of a "substantial property right"
enjoyed by others in the same district; that the Variance would not substantially affect the
general plan; that the Variance would not be contrary to the public interest; and that in
granting the Variance the spirit of the zoning ordinance would still be observed. UTAH
CODE ANN. §10-9-707(2)(a)(ii)-(v). The Hydes also needed to demonstrate that their
claimed hardship arose from "circumstances peculiar to the [P]roperty;" that their
hardship was not self-imposed or economic; and that the special circumstances claimed
by the Hydes deprived the Property of privileges granted to other properties in the same
district. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-707(2)(2)(c)(ii).
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The Hydes also had the burden of proof as to all these issues. Nothing other than
personal desire prevented the Hydes from complying with the requirements of the Code.
The constraints raised by the Hydes were purely self-imposed and should have been well
known to them when they purchased the Property. For instance, the size of the lot was
not a hardship unique to the Hydes. The Hydes were able to build a RE-1 zone compliant
VP

house on their Property without either the Variance or the Reduction; they just did not
want to build what was allowable. The Hydes failed to meet their burden, as personal
frustrations do not constitute "hardship" as contemplated by the statute.
The Court below refers to unspecified "oral findings" that were "by no means
perfect." These "oral findings" were not memorialized in the record in any meaningful
fashion and do not meet the requirements of the UTAH CODE ANN. or the applicable case
0

law. Further, these so-called "oral findings" are not supported by substantial evidence.
The record is clear that it does not contain any evidence upon which the Town could have
possibly made adequate findings of fact sufficient to satisfy that requirements of UTAH
CODE ANN. §10-9-707(2)(a)(i), and therefore the Variance is illegal.
The parties agreed during litigation to amplify the record from the Town
proceedings because it was so deficient. Even with the benefit of time and a proverbial
"second bite at the apple," the Hydes still cannot demonstrate the quantum of evidence
needed to show that they satisfy the five factors of UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-707(a)

vi
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There is no evidence in the record, which can support any finding that the Hydes
met their burden under UTAH CODE ANN. The Hydes personal desire to construct an
unconventional residel)tial dwelling that would accommodate a certain "footprint" for his
garage shop and provide on-site parking for his houseboat are not "hardships" under the
statute.
Based on the lack of evidence and support submitted by the Hydes in support of
their Variance, the Town unlawfully issued the Variance in contravention of UTAH CODE

ANN. § 10-9-707 (2004 ). Neither the evidence before the Town at the Hearing, nor the
additional testimony provided by Hyde and the Town during this action, form the
"substantial evidence" needed to establish the five statutory criteria that the Town said
~

"definitely" supported the issuance of the Variance. Since the record before the Town is
undisputed, the unlawfulness of the Variance is established as a matter of law, entitling
Specht to an award of summary judgment.

b.

The Reduction was Approved in Error

The Reduction was approved wrongfully and in violation of proper procedure.
The facts demonstrate that Mr. Hyde himself, without prior approval, reduced the
diameter of the cul-de-sac by moving dirt and grading (R.530). It was not until after
the Hydes had altered the cul-de-sac that the Town placed the Reduction on its
Planning and Zoning Commission (the "Commission") Agenda for August 10, 2004
(the "August 10 Meeting"). Importantly, there is nothing in the record that
demonstrates that the Hydes submitted a petition for the vacation of the cul-de-sac.
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In reviewing the facts as they apply to the Reduction, it is clear the Town violated the
law in issuing the Ordinance that allowed the Reduction.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9--808 (2004) governs the Reduction of the cul-de-sac in

this case. Pursuant to this section, a cul-de-sac can be vacated or amended in two
ways: a municipality can proceed on its own or an affected party can file a petition. In
either instance, before the municipality can consider the change, the planning
commission must review the proposal and issue a recommendation within 30 days of
the referral. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-808(2)(a) and (b) (2004). After considering the
vi)

planning commission's recommendation, if the Town's legislative body "is satisfied
that neither the public or any person shall be materially injured by the proposed
vacation ... and that there is good cause for the vacation ... the legislative body or
vJJ

officer may vacate ... any street .... " UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-Sl0(b) (emphasis
added). 5
The Town violated this section because the factual record lacks a demonstration
of good cause for the Reduction (R. 39; R. 56; R. 708-710; R. 907-910). In fact, the
Town heard evidence that in fact the Reduction would negatively impact other uses of

5

This section is now found at UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-608. Regardless of the

amendment, the law in effect at the time of the Town's actions controls. Kimball v. Salt
Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 260 (1907) ("It is well settled that the law in force at the time of

the injury controls in actions of this kind." (citation omitted)).
vJ
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the cul-de-sac, since certain vehicles owned by residents on the cul-de-sac needed the
full current radius of the unaltered cul-de-sac in order to maneuver their vehicles. As
such, there was not only a lack of good cause for the Reduction, but the Reduction had

in fact a direct, negative impact on other property owners. Since the evidence before
the Town undisputedly demonstrated that the Reduction caused material injury to other
residents and was unsupported by good cause, the Town wrongfully approved the
Reduction and issued the Ordinance.

2.

The Town Failed to Adhere to Required Notice Procedures

"A petition that lacks the consent of all owners [of property in the affected plat]
may not be scheduled for consideration at a public hearing before the legislative body
~

until the notice required ... is given[.]'' UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-808(b)(5) (2004). 6
Here, neither the Application request for the Variance nor the Reduction had consent
of all the property owners that are affected by the Hydes' changes. As such, notice

~

was mandatory. The Town failed to send the required statutory notice of its intent to

6

§

This statute was amended in 2006 to eliminate this requirement. See UTAH CODE ANN.
I 0-9a-608. The Application and applicable meetings occurred in 2004, prior to the

statutory amendment, and are therefore specifically subject to this requirement as it
existed in 2004.
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consider the Hydes' applications. Since notice was statutorily deficient, the Town's
actions were invalid, mandating an award of summary judgment in Specht's favor.

a.

The Variance

The Hyde's applied for their Variance on July 9, 2004. On July 16, 2004, the
Town posted notice of a July 20, 2004 public hearing on the Hyde's Variance request.
Notice of the July 20, 2004 hearing was never mailed to the affected property owners.

b.

The Reduction

The Town considered the Hyde's Application for the Reduction at two meetings.
For both of these meetings, the notice provided was either insufficient in timing or not
provided at all. The Town placed the Reduction on the Planning and Zoning Agenda
for the August 10, 2014 meeting. It gave only four days' notice of the agenda by
posting the agenda on August 6, 2004. Notably, the Town did not provide the cul-desac property owners any mailed notice of the August 10, 2014 meeting ..
Thereafter, the Town placed the Reduction on the September 21, 2004 Council
agenda. The Town, however, provided only 24-hours' notice of this meeting by
posting the agenda on September 20, 2004. Once again, the Town did not provide the
cul-de-sac owners any mailed notice of the September 21, 2014 meeting.
The notice of both of these meetings was per se defective and do not rise to the
level of notice required by state law. Moreover, the fact of the lack of notice is
undisputed and requires an award of summary judgment in favor of Specht.
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II.

The Reduction Action is Not Subject to an Exhaustion Requirement
As its basis for denying Specht's claims as to the illegality of the Reduction, the

trial court relied on UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 10-9a-701(2); 10-9a-801(1). Under section
801, before an adversely affected person can seek judicial review of an administrative
order, that individual must challenge the Town's actions at the municipal level and
exhaust any administrative remedies. The trial court determined that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to review Specht's challenge of the Reduction because Specht
did not exhaust his administrative remedies. That code section is, however, not
applicable to the Reduction. No ability to administratively appeal was available to
Specht to challenge the Town's actions. 7
vJ)

No ordinance in the Town creates an administrative remedy process in connection
with the Town's legislative act of vacation of public roadways. Where no administrative
~

remedy process is available, the trial court cannot impute a requirement of exhaustion.

Culbertson v. Bd of County Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108, ,r 28, 44 P.3d 642 (citing Vaccaro v.
City of Omaha, 254 Neb. 800, 579 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Neb. 1998) ("Where [a] statute
[does] not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we [have] held such
exhaustion [is] not a jurisdictional prerequisite to instituting legal action.")). Section 725-105 of the UTAH CODE ANN. provides that a public highway remains a highway until

7

Notably, neither the Town nor the Court raised this phantom exhaustion requirement
prior to the trial court's Order.
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the proper authorities order it abandoned or vacated. In vacating a public roadway
through the issuance of a new municipal law, a town acts legislatively, not
~

administratively. Suarez v. Grand County, 2012 UT 72,, 19, 296 P.3d 688 (Utah 2012).
"One hallmark is that [l]egislative power generally ... involves the promulgation of laws
of general applicability." Id.

\IdP

The Reduction is not a land use decision or the making of a regulation subject to
the exhaustion requirements set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-801(1) because: a) the
Reduction was not an action taken under UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-701; and b) because
the Town has not, by ordinance, established any applicable appeal procedures under
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-701. Rather, the issuance of the Reduction was a legislative
action by the Town in which it promulgated a new law (R. 67; R. 71 ). Since the Town's
action was legislative and not administrative, no exhaustion requirement under Section
10-9a-801 ( 1), or any other UTAH CODE ANN. section, applies. The trial court erred in
inventing an exhaustion requirement where none exists.
CONCLUSION

The trial court brought Specht's ten-year struggle to an improper and wrongful
conclusion. The record contains undisputed facts that can lead to only one legal
conclusion - that the Town acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unlawfully in granting the
Variance and the Reduction. The Town not only acted contrary to the applicable sections
of UTAH CODEANN., but it also violated in owns rules and ordinances. This Court should
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reverse the trial court's decisions and return this matter to the trial court with instructions
that summary judgment enter in favor of Specht.
DATED this ~ a y of March, 2016.

CARMAN LEHNHOF ISRAELSEN LLP

Dallis Nordstrom Rohde
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM

Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l l), plaintiff/appellant Richard Specht states
than an addendum is not necessary as required under that paragraph.

~

vJJb

Vj
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~day of March, 2016, BRIEF OF APPELLANT
was served via e-mail to the following:

Paul & Debbie Hyde
phyde@pagelumber.com
Elizabeth Joseph
bwmcprosecutor@thebigpond.com
Jeremy Knight
jknight@strongandhanni.com

Dallis Nordstrom Rohde
V:,

~
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